RECENT CASES
Criminal Law-Treason-Effect of Passport on Allegiance of Alien-[England].--The defendant, a natural-born American citizen, was taken to Ireland
at the age of three by his parents, who apparently became secretly naturalized
British subjects., About 1921 (when he was about fifteen years old) he came to
England, where he remained until 1939. On July 4 1933, he applied for a
British passport, describing himself as born in Ireland, and was granted a passport as a British subject, for five years. On September 24, 1938, he requested
and received a one-year renewal of the passport. On August 4, 1939, he made a
further application for another year's renewal, which was granted, to expire
on July i, 1940. On all applications he described himself as a British subject.
About August 24, 1939, he left England for Germany, where he remained
throughout the war. He was arrested by the British in Germany in 1945 and
had in his possession a document indicating that he had been employed by the
German radio as an English propagandist, beginning September 18, 1939. He
was brought t6 England and indicted for high treason in adhering to the King's
enemies elsewhere than in the King's realm, between September 18, 1939, and
July 2, i94o. He was convicted and sentenced to death by the King's Bench,'
the court holding that the passport spoke for itself on the issue of the protection
afforded by the Crown; that nothing in the evidence divested the defendant of
the duty of allegiance created by that protection; and that the jury should find
him guilty if it believed that he adhered to the King's enemies between the
relevant dates. He was acquitted on two other counts which had assumed his
British citizenship. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal the judgment
was affirmed.3 On appeal to the House of Lords, held, an alien can commit
treason outside the realm if he owes a duty of allegiance. The issuance of the
passport created such a duty of allegiance, which was not divested by any act
in this case, because it created a duty of protection on the part of the Crown.
The English courts have jurisdiction to try aliens for offences committed outside the realm. The issue of whether or not the Crown actually afforded or was
capable of affording protection was not a separate issue and the jury could have
considered it in arriving at their verdict, under the charge of the trial judge.
Judgment affirmed, Porter, L. J., dissenting. Joyce v. Directorof PublicProsecutions.4
I For an excellent discussion of the personal background of the case (the trial of "Lord
Haw Haw"), see Rebecca West's article in 21 New Yorker, No. 5o,.at 28 (Jan. 26, 1946).
Rex v. Joyce, reported in The Times (London) p. 8, col. i (Sept. 20, 1945).
3Rex v. Joyce, 62 T.L.R. 57 (C. Crim. App., 1945).
4 [i946] 1 All E.R. 186 (H.L.), noted in 2oi Law Times 67 (1946).
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The crime of treason is the breach of the duty of allegiance to the state. s
Because of the necessity of allegiance, considerable attention has had to be
devoted to the status of defendants.' Classically, one was born to an allegiance

which one could not later repudiate. 7 Any act against the king came within his
jurisdiction, no 3hatter where committed, if the actor was a born subject, and
later the same rule applied to naturalized subjects.' Similarly, one resident in the
kingdom and enjoying the protection of the crown owes a duty of allegiance."'
The protection given by the sovereign is said to give rise to a correlated duty.
Allegiance is thought of as an unqualified duty, not capable of gradation, although the protection which gives rise to it may be extensive or nominal.
Often the duty of allegiance is the conclusion drawn from protection. Because
the condition of allegiance is a derivative one, when a question of the defendant's
status is raised, the factual issue of protection is raised, and where it cannot be
disposed of mechanically by documentary evidence (such as birth certificates, or
5The Anglo-American law of treason stems from the statute of Edward III, which has
been translated as follows: ".... when a man doth compass or imagine the death of our lord
the King ....or if a man do levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent
to the King's enemies in his realm ....or elsewhere [he shall be a traitor]." 25 Edw. III, stat. 5
(135') as translated in 4 Halsbury's Statutes 273-74 (1929). For an exposition of the history
of the offence see Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 395, 8o6 (i94445); Hurst, English Sources of the American Law of Treason, (1945) Wis. L. Rev. 315; Hazard
and Stern, Exterior Treason, 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 77 (i938); Greenidge, The Conception of
Treason in Roman Law, 7 Jurid. Rev. 228 (1895); Treason in Legal History, i6i Law Times
ii5 (1926); Ploscowe, Treason, 15 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 93 (1935).
6 "An act, it is said, which is treasonable if the actor owes allegiance, is not treasonable if he
does not. As a generalization this is undoubtedly true ...... Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [i9461 i All E.R. 186, i89 (H.L.). Cf. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,38 (1942). For
the most part, these problems of status do not exist in civil law countries where the codes
precisely enumerate the categories of those owing allegiance. Thus the German code of 934
limits the crime to German nationals or residents in Germany, and the French code limits it to
Frenchmen. Hazard and Stern, op. cit. supra, note 5.
7 ". . .. it is a principle of universal law, that the natural-born subject of one prince cannot
by any act of his own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another, put off or discharge his
natural allegiance to the former: for this natural allegiance was intrinsic and primitive, and
antecedent to the other; and cannot be divested without the concurrent act of that prince to
whom it was first due." i Bl. Com. *369. See Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. i (i6og).

8Rex v. Casement, 1917] i'K.B. 98 (1916).
9 A different rule could be reasoned for naturalized subjects because only in modem times
and in some countries does naturalization create the full rights of citizenship. Friedrich, Naturalization, ii Encyc. Soc. Sci.3o5 (935). Note that naturalization in an enemy state in time of
war is treason in itself. Rex v. Lynch, [i9o3] x K.B. 444.
'cal
o
allegiance is that which is due from a foreigner during his residence here; and is
founded in the protection he enjoys for his own person, his family, and effects, during the
time of that residence." i East, Pleas of the Crown 52 (i8o3). This allegiance is not shaken
off by an invasion during which the alien finds himself temporarily outside the de facto realm.
De Jager v. Attorney General of Natal, [1907] A.C. 326 (P.C.). Cf. Carlisle v. United States,
16 Wall. (U.S.) 147 (1872); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, x69 U.S. 649, 655 (1898). It
should be noted that the protection of the crown does not extend to the alien enemy invader
and hence he is incapable of treason. Likewise the crown may extend gratuitous protection
abroad (e.g., evacuating disaster victims on a warship), without creating a duty of allegiance.
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naturalization papers) a value judgment on a series of facts is likely to be necessary. No man can create a duty of allegiance, or destroy it, himself, since it
arises by law from a quantum of protection. A particular act, however, may be
held to destroy the crown's duty of protection. The valuation, in conflicting
facts, of this protection might be said to be similar to the determination of
"negligence" and thus to be a jury question. The trial judge in the instant case,
however, seems to have assumed that the securing of the passport created a
duty of allegiance by a kind of estoppel. Yet the fraudulent securing of a passport on Friday, by an alien who entered the kingdom only Thursday, and left
Saturday, probably would not create the quantum of protection necessary to
make him eligible for the most serious of all crimes. Likewise, if Joyce had
proved that he left the passport in London, the passport alone probably would
not amount to the necessary protection." The distinctions between allegiance
and non-allegiance in cases involving an alien's acts outside the realm are inevitably distinctions of degree.
The doctrine applied in the instant case, that an alien resident or person of
similar status could acquire a duty of allegiance which would follow him outside
the kingdom, was hitherto untested. The courts were unable to find any support
for it other than Sir Michael Foster's reference to a judicial dictum. Foster
states:
.... if such an alien, seeking the protection of the Crown, and having a family and
effects'here, should, during a war with his native country, go thither, and there adhere
to the King's enemies for purposes of hostility, he might be dealt with as a traitor.
For he came and settled here under the protection of the Crown; and, though his person was removed for a time, his effects and family continued still under the same protection. This rule was laid down by all the judges assembled at the Queen's Command,
Jan.

12,

1707.-

The statement has been uncritically lifted by East X3 and Hawkins'4 and was expanded by Holdsworth.S Blackstone, who was Foster's contemporary, makes
no mention of the resolution of the judges, despite the fact that he devotes more
space to allegiance than East and Hawkins combined.' 6 It should be remembered
11Thus also long continued residence alone would not be enough, in all probability, if the
alien were notoriously a foreigner. The problem is incapable of precise classification. See Rex
v. Joyce, 62 T.L.R. 57, 62 (C. Crim. App., 1945).
2 Foster's Crown Cases x83 (3d ed., i8og). A contrary result was reached in United States v.
Villato, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 370 (1797).
isx East, Pleas of the Crown 52 (1803).
14 r Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 8 n. 2 (8th ed., 1824).
'S "The duty of allegiance ceases only when the alien withdraws himself, and his family and

effects, and he remains liable for acts or purposes of hostility, and even in the case of aiding his
own countrymen. This rule was laid down by all the judges in L707 ..... " Holdsworth, in
6 Halsbury's Laws 416, note t (2d ed., 1932).
16

"The reason for the omission may be that Blackstone's Commentaries form. ...

'an

elementary textbook for students and must be judged as such."' Rex v. Joyce, 61 T.L.R.
57, 61 (C. Crim. App. 1945), quoting Lord Birkenhead. No such apology for Blackstone
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that such writers as East and Hawkins, although nicely analytical in conflicts of
7
legal doctrine, were frequently uncritical when it came to documentation.'
Foster's own authority was from subsequently lost manuscripts. He was eighteen at the time of the resolution.
The resolution of the judges described what we should call a permanently
domiciled resident alien, who has left his family behind him. The House of
Lords in the instant case held that the issuance of the passport was a similar
retention of the protection afforded by the crown, and hence created an extension of the duty of allegiance similar to that described in the resolution.
A passport has been described as a document issued in the name of the sovereign to a named individual, intended to be presented to the governments of
foreign nations and to be used for the individual's protection in those countries.' 8
At least in the United States, it is no evidence of citizenship in the courts of the
issuing nation,19 and abroad it has the restricted effect of requiring diplomatic
action before the fact of citizenship is questioned.20 In wartime some investigation would probably be required before any effect would be given to the document, - and the courts in the instant case admitted that the protection afforded
by the passport depended largely on what faith officials abroad would place on
its face value. It is difficult to see how the protection afforded by the passport
can be assumed unless its actual or potential use 2 while outside the kingdom is
assumed, and it was never proved that the defendant took the passport with
him on leaving England. The usages of the channel passage in i939 and the
strictness of controls on movement may have been, with the passport, convincing circumstantial evidence of protection or the availability of protection. It is
difficult, however, to disagree with Porter, L. J., that such evidence should have
gone to the jury as part of the material facts at issue.'3 When the treason of the
defendant hangs by the thin thread of allegiance, and the latter issue narrowly
appears in the thorough discussion in 12 Holdsworth, History of English Law 702-37 (x938).
For a favorable evaluation of Foster see ibid., at 135; Hurst, Treason in the United States,
58 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 395, 8o6, at 856 (i44-45).
17 See Radin, On Legal Scholarship, 46 Yale L. J. 1124 (i937).
Is Rex v. Brailsford, [igo5l 2 K.B. 730, 745. Compare: "The passport is, at most, a written
permission from his government to travel, and, in the absence of express treaty provisions,
has no effect upon his [the holder's] status at all." U.S. ex rel. Calamia v. Redfern, i8o Fed.
5o6, 5o8 (C.C. La., igio).
'9 Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 9 Pet. (U.S.) 692 (1835).
2"Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 517 (915).
22 Hyde, International Law 202-9 (2d rev. ed., 1945).
"Any use, even as a matter of mere convenience, would probably be an availing of the
protection afforded by the passport. Cf. United States v. Browder, 113 F. 2d 9 7 (C.C.A. 2d,
x94o), where it was held that exhibition of a fraudulently obtained passport, on gaining reentry to the United States, was a use of the passport, even though other evidence of citizenship was permissible for this purpose.
n3 Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] 1 All E.R. 186, 193, 194 (H.L.).
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depends (as the House of Lords treats it) on an alleged protection afforded by
the use or possession of a physical object, the retention of the object or its use is
a fact from which it might be determined that the defendant owed allegiance.
It would also be relevant to determine what protection was afforded by being
listed at home as a recipient of the document. The House of Lords is wrong,
however, in treating the securing of the document as conclusive. It is doubtful
whether the defendant in a criminal action should have to prove the loss or
destruction of the object, since its retention or potential use is a material part
of the prosecution's case.2 4 The problem is not one of a properly issued passport held by a subject, the physical object in that case being merely evidence of
the right. Here the very limited right to protection was considered to arise from
5

the object itself.2

A reader of the Lord Chancellor's opinion is not likely to be satisfied by the
inference of so much from the securing of a document. A better example of the
distinction between the stated rationale and the tacit premises of a case would
be hard to find. What probably impressed the House of Lords 6 was that Joyce
had been long a resident within the Kingdom; that he had so often stated his
citizenship to be British, and had been regarded as a citizen so often, that the
defect in his citizenship would not be evident in routine examination. Further
weight was undoubtedly given to the facts that Joyce had once applied for
reserve officer training in England; that although he now claimed American
citizenship he had never asked for or received the protection of the American
government; and that he had possibly availed himself of the crown's protection
outside the realm by securing a passport. Assuming the resolution reported by
Foster to be correct, these facts could lead to the conclusion that a quantum
of protection, sufficient to determine that the defendant owed allegiance, had
been afforded.
24The court implied that the possession or non-possession of the passport was a fact peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge, and hence the burden of disproving possession was
on him. This rule is frequently applied to special statutory crimes. Rossi v. United States, 289
U.S. 89 (1933) (distillery in home proved; defendant must prove license, as he could easily do
so). It is not, however, a general rule of criminal law, and usually applies only where defendant can produce a document as a defence, not where a series of probative facts would have
to be adduced as in the instant case. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2486, 253o (3d ed., 194o).
If the evidence produced by the prosecution is considered to prove the crime beyond doubt,
the burden of going forward shifts to the defendant. Thus the burden of disproving possession
of the passport should be upon Joyce only if the securing of the passport is considered to make
a prima fade case. Cf. ibid., at § 2487; Rex v. Ewart, 25 N.Z. L. R. 709 (i9o5).
2s It should be noted that Joyce was charged with treason consisting of propaganda broadcasts for Germany made between September i8, 1939 and July 2, 194o (the passport expired
July i, 194o). See The Times (London) p. 8, col. i (Sept. 18, 1945). If it had been alleged
that Joyce had contracted with German agents in such a way that the securing of a passport
was an essential step in the plot, then the mere application for the passport might be an overt
act of treason. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 34, n. 43 (1945).
26A study of the reports of the trial reveals much that is ignored in the appellate opinions.
See The Times (London) p. 8, col. i (Sept. 18, 1945); ibid., p. 8, col. i (Sept. ig, 1945); ibid.,
p. 8, col. i (Sept. 20, i945).
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Taking unexpressed notice of these factors, the failure to prove the possession
of the passport was treated as immaterial by the House of Lords. The Lord
Chancellor stated that the jury could not have failed to appreciate that it was
for them to consider whether the passport remained at all material times in the
possession of Joyce. He added that no evidence could be given by the crown,
and "for obvious reasons" no evidence was given by the defendant, upon this
question.27 It is difficult to see how the jury could have considered the issue of
whether or not the passport afforded or was capable of affording protection,
under the charge of the trial judge as it is reported. 28 The court apparently felt,
however, that in view of the other facts of the case this defect was a mere technicality.29 The superficial comparison between the Joyce case and Cramer v.
United States3o might suggest a contrast. The English courts seem determined
to convict while the United States Supreme Coart narrows the concept of treason by requiring an unusually high standard of proof of intent. The contrast
may be largely that of a court in which every judge has been exposed to physical
danger and suffering, and a court sitting in a country comparatively untouched
by war. Few Englishmen surveying the wreckage of their island are likely to be
troubled by the charge to the jury in Rex v. Joyce.
Since the result in the Joyce case was a foregone conclusion, the important
problem is not the applicability of the law to the facts before the House of
Lords but the applicability of this case to future sets of facts. The Lord Chancellor seems to have been conscious that a court which feels unable to overrule
itself3' should be careful not to let a particular case carry the court into undesirable doctrine. A close analysis of the opinion of the court reveals surprisingJoyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [x946] i All E.R. i86, 193 (H.L.).
See portions quoted by the Times (London) p. 8 col. i (Sept. 20, 1945), and those included in the dissenting opinion, Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [19461 1 All E.R.
x86, 195, i96 (H.L.). Their substance is contained in the following statement to counsel before
the summing up:" '.. . . when the passport was applied for, the prisoner beyond a shadow of
a doubt owed allegiance to the Crown of this country and .... on the evidence given ....
nothing happened .... thereafter to put an end to the allegiance ..... It will remain for the
jury, and for the jury alone, as to whether at the relevant dates he adhered to the king's
enemies.'" Ibid., at 195.
29 "For it is clear that here no question of principle is involved. The narrow point appears
to be whether in the course of this protracted and undeniably difficult case the judge removed
from the jury and himself decided a question of fact which it was for them to decide." Joyce v.
Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] 1 All E.R. i86, x93 (H.L.).
-°0325 U.S. 1 (1945). In this case it was held, inter alia, that an act of treason, to be an
overt act of treason within Article 3 Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution, had to be proved by
direct and not circumstantial evidence. No case has come up in the American courts determining how the status of the defendant is to be proved, and the question of how the problem of the
instant case would be decided here is an interesting one. But the few American cases on the
allegiance of aliens have stated that it is coterminous with "residence." Charge to the Grand
Jury, Fed. Cas. No. 18,273 (D.C. Mass., 1861). The statute reads: "Whoever, owing allegiance
to the United States, levies war .... [etc.]" 35 Stat. io88 (19o9), i8 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1927).
31 London Street Tramways Co. v. London City Council, [1898 A.C. 375 (H.L.). See authority listed in ig Halsbury's Laws 253 (2d ed., 1935).
'7
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ly little new law. An alien can commit treason outside the realm if he owes a
duty of allegiance. Such a duty may arise even from the illegal issuance of a
passport.3' No conclusion can be drawn from the handling of the trial court's
charge to the jury. The House of Lords merely states that the trial judge left the
issue of protection to the jury, and quotes no part of the summing-up, which clearly assumed, as completely a matter of law, this essentially factual issue. Since
future generations will be unlikely to compare the decision and the record, the
court managed to leave unmarred the structure of English justice and still reach
its desired result.

Damages-Applicability of OPA Ceiling Prices as Measure of Damages[Iowa].-The plaintiff sued in a tort action to recover damages for the destruction of a truck in a collision. The defendant contended that the proper measure
of damages was the Office of Price Administration ceiling price of the truck,
which was $634.55. The trial court instructed the jury that if it found the plaintiff entitled to recover for the loss of the truck, he should be allowed "the fair
and reasonable market value of the truck, immediately preceding the accident,
less its salvage value, if any, immediately following the accident, not to exceed
the amount of $1,200, the amount claimed therefor.", The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded him $I,2oo damages. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, held, the evidence supported the verdict, and the trial court
did not err in failing to instruct the jury that the OPA ceiling price was the
proper measure of damages. The purpose of the OPA regulations was to govern
prices in the sale of goods, and not to put a ceiling upon the recovery of damages
in a negligence action. Ross Produce Co. v. Thompson.2
The traditional purpose behind the award of damages in a tort action is to
put the plaintiff in the same position, as far as a money award can, that he
312Cf. the American case closest to the Joyce case, United States v. Stephan, So F. Supp.
448 (Mich., 1943), holding that fraud in obtaining a naturalization certificate was not pleadable in defence of a treason charge, since the naturalization was voidable (by the Government) and not void. Interestingly enough, the Government has voided naturalization on
grounds of fraud because the citizen had engaged in disloyal acts not sufficient for a treason
charge. United States v. Kuhn, 49 F. Supp. 407 (N.Y., 1943).

I Record, at 59. The "fair and reasonable market value" was estimated at $I,3oo; the
salvage value at $ioo. The difference between the OPA price and the "fair and reasonable
market value" was not as great as the figures suggest. The OPA price of $634.55 was the
figure at which an individual could sell a truck to another individual or to a dealer. If the
plaintiff, who used the truck in his poultry business, had sought to purchase a similar truck
from a dealer, under the OPA regulations the dealer would be allowed to add x5 per cent to
the above figure. Furthermore, the OPA price included only the chassis, cab, and tires, and
did not include the box and any accessories attached to the truck. The "fair and reasonable
market value" included all these items. The evidence, however, did not indicate whether the
box and accessories were included in the $ioo salvage allowance.

22o N.W.

2d

57 (Iowa, i945).

